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a b s t r a c t
As Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) become increasingly popular, it is necessary to
require Intrusion Detection System (IDS) available to detect internal malicious sensor
nodes. Because sensor nodes have limited capabilities in terms of their computation,
communication, and energy, selecting the profitable detection strategy for lowering
resources consumption determines whether the IDS can be used practically. In this paper,
we adopt the distributed-centralized network in which each sensor node has equipped
an IDS agent, but only the IDS agent resided in the Cluster Head (CH) with sufficient
energy will launch. Then, we apply the signaling game to construct an Intrusion Detection
Gamemodeling the interactions between amalicious sensor node and a CH-IDS agent, and
seek its equilibriums for the optimal detection strategy. We illustrate the stage Intrusion
Detection Game at an individual time slot in aspects of its player’s utilities, pure-strategy
Bayesian–Nash equilibrium (BNE) and mixed-strategy BNE. Under these BNEs the CH-IDS
agent is not always on the Defend strategy, as a result, the power of CH can be saved. As the
game evolves, we develop the stage Intrusion Detection Game into a multi-stage dynamic
Intrusion Detection Game in which, based on Bayesian rules, the beliefs on the malicious
sensor node can be updated. Upon the current belief and the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE), the best response strategy for the CH-IDS agent can be gained. Afterward, we
propose an intrusion detection mechanism and corresponding algorithm. We also study
the properties of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game by simulations. The
simulation results have shown the effectiveness of the proposed game, thus, the CH-IDS
agents are able to select their optimal strategies to defend the malicious sensor nodes’
Attack action.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Recently,WSNs have developed from a promising research area to a useful technology applicable to real world scenarios.
Akyildiz et al. [1] have classified the applications of WSNs as military applications, environmental applications, health
applications, home applications, and other commercial applications. In the near future, WSNs that are comprised of small-
sized, low-power and low-cost sensor nodes will become an integral part of our lives.
Similar to any computer-related environment, security in WSNs is considered as a non-functional but essential
requirement that maintains the complex system as available and reliable. There are prevention-based and detection-based
mechanisms to guarantee network security. The prevention-based technologies that provide confidentiality, integrity and
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Notations
θS : Member sensor node S (Sender). If S is normal then θS = 0 else θS = 1.
θR: CH-IDS agent R (Receiver).
aS(θS = 0): Action of the normal member sensor node.
aS(θS = 1): Action of the malicious member sensor node.
AS(θS): Actions space of the member sensor node.
aR(θR): Action of the CH-IDS agent.
AR(θR): Actions space of the CH-IDS agent.
gA: Attack gain of the malicious member sensor node.
gC : Cooperation gain of the malicious/normal member sensor node.
gD: Defend gain of the CH-IDS agent.
cA: Attack cost for the malicious member sensor node.
cC : Cooperation cost for the malicious/normal member sensor node.
cD: Defend cost for the CH-IDS agent.
lF : False alarm loss of the CH-IDS agent.
α: Detection rate of the CH-IDS agent.
β: False alarm rate of the CH-IDS agent.
p: Probability of malicious member sensor nodes.
ρ: Probability of the malicious member sensor node selecting the action Attack.
δ: Probability of the CH-IDS agent selecting the action Defend.
ρ∗: Equilibrium probability of the malicious member sensor node selecting the action Attack.
δ∗: Equilibrium probability of the CH-IDS agent selecting the action Defend.
σS : Strategy profile of the malicious member sensor node.
σ ∗S : Equilibrium strategy profile of the malicious member sensor node.
σR: Strategy profile of the CH-IDS agent.
σ ∗R : Equilibrium strategy profile of the CH-IDS agent.
ρk: Probability of the malicious member sensor node selecting the action Attack at the tkth stage game.
ρ∗k : Equilibrium probability of the malicious member sensor node selecting the action Attack at the tkth stage
game.
δk: Probability of the CH-IDS agent selecting the action Defend at the tkth stage game.
δ∗k : Equilibrium probability of the CH-IDS agent selecting the action Defend at the tkth stage game.
σSk : Strategy profile of the malicious member sensor node at the tkth stage game.
σ ∗Sk : Equilibrium strategy profile of the malicious member sensor node at the tkth stage game.
σRk : Strategy profile of the CH-IDS agent at the tkth stage game.
σ ∗Rk : Equilibrium strategy profile of the CH-IDS agent at the tkth stage game.
authentication security requirements usually include cryptography, key management, secure routing, secure data fusion
and so on. On the other hand, the detection approaches are generally realized by the Intrusion Detection System (IDS), such
as DTRAB in [2]. Because there are malicious sensor nodes in WSNs, as the first line of defense, only using the prevention
mechanism is not sufficient to ensure WSN security. The objective of malicious sensor nodes is to maximize the damage to
theWSNswhileminimizing the chance of being caught. They get gains by disrupting the operation of theWSNs andwasting
the resources of normal sensor nodes. In order tominimize the impact ofmalicious sensor nodes,WSNs demand the IDS that
is capable of detecting malicious sensor nodes that have broken down the network prevention-based mechanisms. Using
the IDS, the WSNs will be able to respond and isolate the intruders to ensure their normal operation.
One of the primary issues that has to be solved before the IDS can be applied to the WSNs practically is how to select
the profitable detection strategy that lowers the resource consumption of WSNs. This is because individual sensor nodes
in WSNs own constrained resources that consist of limited computation capability, storage capability, and communication
bandwidth. In particular, they are battery operated, often having limited energy. Another reason is that employing intrusion
detection to small sensor nodes is a costly task. In essence, IDS approaches are usually computationally expensive. Although
the capabilities of a sensor node will increase in the near future with the rapid change of technology, the problem of saving
sensor nodes’ resources should be considered continually.
Game theory is a formal, mathematical discipline that studies situations of competition and cooperation between several
involved parties [3]. It has beenwidely applied in the field of network security, e.g. incentives to P2P security [4], preventing
DoS attack [5–9], and intrusion detection [10–13].
When a game of incomplete information has many stages, the signaling game, a form of game theory, in which the
posterior probability can be updated dynamically, is always considered. In short, the signaling game refers to a class of
two-player game in which one player (called the Sender) is informed and the other (called the Receiver) is not. The Sender ’s
strategy set consists of actions contingent on its type while the Receiver ’s strategy set consists of actions contingent on the
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Sender ’s actions. Generally, in a signaling game, the Sender has the private information that is its type set while the Receiver
has the common information that is its only type.
The intrusion detection in WSNs can be modeled as a signaling game. Generally, a classic IDS for guaranteeing WSN
security is composed of the monitor and decision modules. The monitor module is used to check the WSNs’ events while
the decision module is used to decide whether an event is normal or not. This dynamic situation is an interaction between
malicious sensor nodes and the IDS that is designed and implemented tomakeWSNs secure. As a tool, signaling game is very
profitable to depict the characteristic of interactive situations above. This approach can achieve the consequence of selecting
the Defend strategy optimally, which will improve IDS’ real positive outcomes and save energy consumption effectively.
In this paper, we use the signaling game to capture and analyze the interactions between a malicious sensor node and a
CH-IDS agent inWSNs.We set up the distributed-centralized networkmodel, in which each sensor node has been equipped
with an IDS agent. Not all IDS agents, but only the IDS agent in CH will launch to save power consumption and reduce
channel contention and packet collisions. The stage Intrusion Detection Game is considered at an individual time slot. We
seek the condition of equilibrium existence and find the pure-strategy BNE and mixed-strategy BNE respectively. As the
game evolves, we study the mixed-strategy PBE of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game where the CH-IDS
agent can dynamically update its beliefs based on the new actions of its opponent, and then adjust its strategy accordingly.
Upon the idea of the PBE of multi-stage dynamic intrusion detection, we design the intrusion detection mechanism and
corresponding algorithm.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
(1) We formulate an Intrusion Detection Game based on the signaling game to study the strategy of malicious sensor nodes
and CH-IDS agents, which satisfies such a situation where the CH-IDS agent is uncertain about the type of its opponent;
(2) We set up and prove the theories of equilibriums of our game, which provide the optimal strategy for the CH-IDS agent
to decide whether to take Defend or Idle. That is, the CH-IDS agents are not always on Defend and thus their energies are
saved;
(3) Based on the PBE, we design the CH-IDS agent and corresponding algorithm;
(4) We construct simulation experiments to support the efficiency of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game.
The rest of the paper contains six sections. In Section 2, we overview related works, and focus on the difference between
our work and other related works. In Section 3, we depict our Intrusion Detection Game in WSNs in terms of the network
model, the stage Intrusion Detection Game at individual time slot as well as its pure-strategy BNE and mixed-strategy BNE,
and the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game as well as its PBE. In Section 4, we propose an intrusion detection
mechanism based on the PBE and give the detection algorithm. In Section 5, we show our simulations to explore the
properties of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game. Finally, a conclusion is provided in Section 6.
2. Related work
In our previous work [14], we recalled that the typical security applications consist of preventing DoS attack [5–9],
intrusion detection [10–13], and coexistence with malicious nodes [15]. Currently, few papers employ the signaling
game [16,17] for studying Ad hoc networks’ security and only one [15] using the signaling game for WSN security. Next,
we will summarize an intrusion detection system [10–13,15] using game theory for WSNs and the signaling game [15–17]
used in the area of wireless communications, which are much closer to this paper.
McCune et al. [10] considered the WSNs broadcast environment where a Denial of Message (DOM) attack is caused by
malicious sensor nodes. In order to avoid this attack, they proposed a Secure Implicit Sampling (SIS) protocol that works
by eliciting authenticated acknowledgements from a subset of sensor nodes per broadcast. The malicious node and SIS are
regarded as two players in a zero-sum game whose equilibrium is given by a minmax construction on the utilities of the
malicious node and SIS respectively. Reddy [11] studied the IDS during transferring data between sensor nodes and the BS.
This case is modeled by a two-player, zero-sum, and non-cooperative game between the attacker and the IDS at the CH. This
game is not Pareto optimal and has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, but has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus,
an optimal defense strategy for the WSNs can be attained and the chance of detecting intrusions is increased significantly.
Kodialam and Lakshman [12] proposed that the intrusion detection can be performed by sampling a portion of the packets
transmitted through selected network links or router interfaces. In order to decrease network costs incurred by sampling,
it is necessary to develop a sampling strategy that does not exceed a given total sampling budget, which is considered by a
game-theoretic framework. They modeled a two-player and zero-sum game between the intruder and the service provider.
There exists a minmax optimal solution Nash equilibrium to the game. According to the minmax optimal solution, the
malicious packets will be sampled atmost on a link along any paths. Alpcan and Basa¸r [13]modeled the interaction between
malicious attackers and the IDS with Markov game, which is a two-player and zero-sum game. According to the degree of
knowing theWSN’s characteristics and the opponents’ actions, they discussed three different information structures: (a) full
information, (b) no information about sensor network characteristics, and (c) having only information about own costs, past
actions, and past states. In the case of full information, each player knows everything about the WSNs, so, he can use the
well-known Markov Decision Process (MDP) method to compute the optimal mixed-strategy solution to the game. In the
case of no information, the attacker can calculate its optimal strategy using minmax-Q , which is a variation of the standard
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Q -learning technique. In the third case, the players use a single agent naïve Q -learning scheme to optimize their strategies,
which ignores the other players’ actions.
Wang et al. [15] studied the coexistence between a malicious sensor node and a normal sensor node in WSNs. Even if a
malicious sensor node is detected, maybe it does not know whether it has been identified or not, and it still disguises itself
like a normal sensor node. Therefore, there might be situations where malicious sensor nodes can be kept and used. This
coexistence gives both the malicious and normal sensor nodes different benefits. The authors formalize these interactions
into two games. The first game, namely the malicious sensor node detection game, is a signaling game. The second game,
called the post-detection game, is played when the normal sensor node knows confidently that its opponent is a malicious
sensor node. For the stage detection game, they analyzed its pure-strategy BNE andmixed-strategy BNE. As the gameevolves,
the belief is updated upon Bayesian rules and the dynamic malicious node detection game has a PBE. For the post-detection
game, a coexistence index is introduced if the index for the malicious sensor node falls under a certain threshold, then the
normal sensor node will report the malicious node and terminate the post-detection game, its existence of mixed-strategy
equilibrium is also proved.
Patcha and Park [16] employed the signaling game to model the intrusion detection in the Ad Hoc networks where a
host-based IDS is used, however, they did not thoroughly research into the game’s properties such as the equilibrium of
the game. Li et al. [17] made use of a dynamic Bayesian game framework to analyze the interactions between normal and
malicious nodes in Ad Hoc networks. The normal node updates its belief based on the opponent’s behavior, chooses the
probability to cooperate with its opponent based on its belief, and follows a rational decision rule to report. On the other
hand, the malicious node evaluates its risk of being caught to decide when to flee for avoiding punishment. Some possible
countermeasures are also proposed for normal nodes that can affect malicious nodes’ decisions.
Compared to [10–13], our work is distinguishable in the factors of game type and equilibrium.Wemodel the interactions
between a member sensor node and a CH-IDS agent with signaling game. In addition, we seek the pure-strategy BNE and
mixed-strategy BNE for the stage game, and the mixed-strategy PBE for the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game.
These equilibriums determine when and how the CH-IDS agent takes a Defend action. Our ideas partly derive from the
malicious sensor node detection game in [15], however, when conducting the utilities of the game, we think the detection
rate and false alarm rate of CH-IDS agent must be considered while the channel unreliability and the attack success rate are
considered in [15]. As a result, we get different equilibrium equations compared to [15]. Besides, our work centrally focuses
on the signaling game to decide the strategy of intrusion detection in WSNs while they [16,17] studied the situations of Ad
Hoc networks. In addition, our network model is different from the related works above, we think that it is profitable to
make the IDS agent reside in every sensor node, but only the IDS agent in CH performs intrusion detection based on the
signaling game in order to save power consumption.
3. Intrusion Detection Game in WSNs
3.1. Network model
According to the installation location of IDS agent, Farooqi and Khan [18] have classified various IDS in WSNs into three
categories: purely distributed, purely centralized, and distributed-centralized. In the purely distributed case, the IDS agent
is installed in each sensor node that checks the abnormal behavior of neighboring sensor nodes locally. Whereas, in the
purely centralized case, the IDS agent is installed in the Base Station (BS), which requires an additional routing protocol
that collects data from sensor nodes to analyze the behavior of sensor nodes. Because the cluster based approach lowers
the energy consumption and reduces control overhead efficiently, this philosophy is introduced to the last distributed-
centralized case where IDS agents are only installed in monitor sensor nodes that not only perform activities like normal
nodes but also check for intrusion detection.
Our network model adopts the distributed-centralized approach. Unlike the situation where the IDS agent is installed
in monitors’ sensor nodes only, the IDS agents in our network model are deployed in each node. At the same time, because
clustering has been shown to improve network lifetime [19], clustering is used to organize our WSNs into a connected
hierarchy. By using clustering, sensor nodes are organized into clusters. Each cluster has a coordinator, called the Cluster
Head (CH), and anumber ofmember sensor nodes. Clustering results in a two-tier hierarchy inwhichCHs form thehigher tier
whilemember sensor nodes form the lower tier. In this hierarchy,member sensor nodes send their data to the responsible CH
and the CH aggregates the data and sends them to the BS through other CHs. To balance the energy consumption uniformly
on all the nodes, the CHs must be re-clustered periodically. In contrast to flat architectures, clustering provides obvious
advantages in terms of conserving energy and reducing channel contention and packet collisions.When an energy-abundant
sensor node is selected as a CH, the IDS agent will run simultaneously while the IDS agents in member sensor nodes are
asleep. Thus, besides aggregating and sending data, the CH performs the task of intrusion detection by the IDS agent. Fig. 1
depicts the structure of our network model.
In Fig. 1, the legitimate sensor nodes include CHs and the BS. The type of member sensor nodes is either Normal or
Malicious. Thesemember sensor nodes know their own types, but the CHs donot know theirmember sensor nodes’ types. For
this network scenario, we will apply a multi-stage dynamic signaling game to model the process of detecting the malicious
member sensor nodes. When a signaling game evolves, it can be divided into continuous and individual time slots at which
a stage Intrusion Detection Game is played.
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Fig. 1. Network model.
Table 1
Utilities of intrusion detection game.
Defend Idle
(a) Member sensor node S is malicious
Attack (1− α) · gA − α · gD − cA, α · gD − (1− α) · gA − cD gA− cA,−gA
Cooperate gC − cC ,−β · lF −cD gC − cC , 0
(b) Member sensor node S is normal
Cooperate gC − cC ,−β · lF − cD gC − cC , 0
3.2. Stage Intrusion Detection Game
According to the characteristics of WSNs and IDS, we choose some parameters for our Intrusion Detection Game. When
themaliciousmember sensor nodemakes attacks towaste theWSNs’ resources, the networkwill be disrupted and gradually
crashed during the communication between two neighbors. This process gives malicious nodes a payoff from their attacks;
however they have to pay the cost of consumption due to their attacks. Therefore, for a malicious member sensor node, we
introduce gA and cA to denote attack gain and cost respectively. When a member sensor node selects the action Cooperate
thatmeans the node is available to communicate, the packet then can be forwarded successfully. The normalmember sensor
node will benefit from this good network while the malicious node will also get payoff for its disguise. However, receiving
and forwarding packets during the cooperation will consume energy. For simplicity, we suppose that both the malicious
and normal nodes get the same payoff as well as pay the same cost. Therefore, for a member sensor node, we introduce gC
and cC to denote cooperation gain and cost respectively. When it selects the Defend strategy, the CH-IDS agent gets the gain,
gD, for having successfully detected the malicious member sensor node. At the same time, it should pay for the cost, cD, for
energy consumption. Obviously, there exist the detection rate and the false alarm rate, denoted by α and β respectively,
in the CH-IDS agent like any general IDS. The false alarm means that the member sensor node in normal communication is
detected in error, which will lead to a loss, lF , to the CH-IDS agent.
In our stage Intrusion Detection Game, we consider two players, i.e., member sensor node S (Sender), denoted by θS , and
CH-IDS agent R (Receiver), denoted by θR. Member sensor node S may be Normal, denoted by θS = 0, orMalicious, denoted
by θS = 1, and its type is private information to CH-IDS agent R. At each time slot, each player chooses its action from its
actions space. When member sensor node R is malicious, it may attack or cooperate because it wants to disguise itself. That
is, the action of θS = 1, denoted by aS(θS = 1), may be Attack or Cooperate. Whenmember sensor node R isNormal, it always
cooperates. That is, the action of θS = 0, denoted by aS(θS = 0), is always Cooperate. Therefore, the actions space, denoted
by AS(θS), for member sensor node S is {Attack, Cooperate}. In order to save energy to prolong the lifetime of CH, the CH-IDS
agent should not always be the action Defend, i.e., sometimes it should be Idle. That is, the action of θR, denoted by aR(θR),
may be Defend or Idle. Therefore, the action’s space, denoted by AR(θR), for CH-IDS agent R is {Defend, Idle}. The utilities of
the Intrusion Detection Game are showed in Table 1.
The actions in Table 1, except IDS’ Idle, incur costs. For the action profile (aS(θS = 1) = Attack, aS(θR) = Defend), the
utility of θS = 1 is the gain of being not detected minus the loss of being detected minus the attack cost while the utility
of θR is the gain of detecting successfully minus the loss of not detecting minus the detection cost. For the action profile
(aS(θS = 1) = Attack, aS(θR) = Idle), the utility of θS = 1 is the attack gain minus the attack cost while the utility of θR
is the loss of being attacked. For the action profile (aS(θS = 1) = Cooperate, aR(θR) = Defend), the utility of θS = 1 is the
cooperation gain minus the cooperation cost while the utility of θR is the loss of false alarm minus the defend cost. As for
the other actions profiles, they are easy to understand.
Thus, we can describe the definition of the static Intrusion Detection Game as follows.
Definition 1. The stage Intrusion Detection Game is a 5-tuple (N,Θ, A, P,U) where:
• N = { member sensor node S, CH-IDS agent R} is a set of 2 players;
• Θ = ΘS × ΘR, where ΘS = {θS = 0, θS = 1} is the set of type space of the player S and ΘR = {θR} is the set of type
space of the player R;
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Fig. 2. Extensive form of the game.
• A = AS × AR, where AS = {AS(θS = 0), AS(θS = 1)} = {{aS(θS = 0)| Cooperate}, {aS(θS = 1)|Attack, Cooperate}} is the
set of actions available to the player S and AR = {aR| Defend, Idle} is the set of actions available to the player R;
• P : Θ → [0, 1] is a common prior probability distribution over types, P = (p, 1− p)where p denotes the probability of
malicious member sensor nodes and then 1− p denotes the probability of normal nodes;
• U = (uS, uR), where uS : A×Θ → R is the utility function for the player S and uR : A×Θ → R is the utility function for
the player R, the values of uS and uR are illustrated in Table 1.
3.3. Equilibriums of stage Intrusion Detection Game
As a game of incomplete information, the stage Intrusion Detection Game can attain BNE, but the CH-IDS agent R does not
know the type of themember sensor node S. According to the timing of signaling game, a virtual player Nature is introduced
andNaturewill act firstly to decide the type of player S. Thus, the stage Intrusion Detection Game is changed into a complete
but imperfect information game and the extensive form of the game is constructed in Fig. 2.
Theorem 1. In the stage Intrusion Detection Game, there is a pure-strategy BNE when
p < (β · lF + cD)/(α · gD+ α · gA+ β · lF ). (1)
Proof. (1) When member sensor node S selects the pure-strategy (aS(θS = 1) = Attack, aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate) which
means that member sensor node S always plays Attack if it is malicious and Cooperate if it is normal. Then, for the CH-IDS
agent R, the expected utilities of Defend and Idle are
EuR(Defend) = p · (α · gD− (1− α) · gA − cD)+ (1− p) · (−β · lF − cD) (2)
and
EuR(Idle)= −p · gA+(1− p) · 0= −p · gA . (3)
If EuR(Defend) ≥ EuR(Idle), i.e.,
p · (α · gD− (1− α) · gA − cD)+ (1− p) · (−β · lF − cD) ≥ −p · gA
p ≥ (β · lF + cD)/(α · gD+ α · gA+ β · lF ), (4)
then the dominant strategy for the CH-IDS agent R is Defend. However, if CH-IDS agent R plays Defend, Attackwill not be the
dominant strategy for member sensor node S because
(1− α) · gA − α · gD− cA < gC − cC (5)
is reasonable. Therefore, {(aS(θS = 1) = Attack, aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate), aR(θR) = Defend} is not a pure-strategy BNE.
If EuR(Defend) < EuR(Idle), i.e.,
p < (β · lF + cD)/(α · gD+ α · gA+ β · lF ), (6)
then the dominant strategy for CH-IDS agent R is Idle. Correspondingly, Attack will be the dominant strategy for member
sensor node S because
gA − cA > (1− α) · gA − α · gD − cA (7)
is reasonable. Therefore, {(aS(θS = 1) = Attack, aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate), aR(θR) = Idle} is a pure-strategy BNE.
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(2) When member sensor node S selects the pure-strategy (aS(θS = 1) = Cooperate, aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate) which
means it always plays the action Cooperate regardless of its type. For CH-IDS agent R, the best response to Cooperate of
member sensor node S is Idle; and for malicious member sensor node θS = 1, the best response to Idle of CH-IDS agent
R is Attack. This is contradictive to the pure-strategy (aS(θS = 1) = Cooperate, aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate), therefore,
{(aS(θS = 1) = Cooperate, aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate), aR(θR) = Idle} is not a pure-strategy BNE.
In summary, when
p < (β · lF + cD)/(α · gD+ α · gA+ β · lF ), (8)
there is a pure-strategy BNE {(aS(θS = 1) = Attack, aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate), aR(θR) = Idle} which means the malicious
member sensor node always plays Attack and the normal member sensor node always plays Cooperate while the CH-IDS
agent R always plays Idle.
Although there is a pure-strategy BNE, it is not practical because CH-IDS agent R must take action Idle according to the
Theorem 1. That is, the malicious member sensor nodes will not be caught forever. Therefore, only achieving pure-strategy
BNE is not enough for the Intrusion Detection Game, it is essential to find a mixed-strategy BNE for detecting malicious
sensor nodes. 
Theorem 2. In the stage Intrusion Detection Game, there is a mixed-strategy BNE when
p ≥ (β · lF + cD)/(α · gD+ α · gA+β · lF ). (9)
Proof. Obviously, such a mixed-strategy BNE exists when
p ≥ (β · lF + cD)/(α · gD+ α · gA+β · lF ). (10)
For the malicious member sensor node θS = 1, let the mixed strategy σS = (ρ, 1− ρ), then, for the CH-IDS agent R, the
expected utilities of Defend and Idle are
EuR(Defend) = ρ · p · (α · gD− (1− α) ·gA− cD)+ (1− ρ) · p · (−β · lF − cD)+ (1− p) · (−β · lF − cD) (11)
and
EuR(Idle) = ρ · p · (−gA)+ (1− ρ) · p · 0+ (1− p) · 0= −ρ · p · gA . (12)
According to the indifference between Defend and Idle under the mixed-strategy σS , we can get
EuR(Defend)= EuR(Idle)
ρ∗ = (β · lF + cD)/(p · α · gD+ p · α · gA+ p · β · lF ). (13)
For the CH-IDS agent R, let themixed-strategy σR = (δ, 1−δ), then, for themember sensor node S, the expected utilities
of Attack and Cooperate are
EuS(Attack) = δ · p · ((1− α) · gA − α · gD − cA)+ (1− δ) · p · (gA − cA) (14)
and
EuS(Cooperate) = δ · p · (gC − cC )+ (1− δ) · p · (gC − cC )+ δ · (1− p) · (gC − cC )
+ (1− δ) · (1− p) · (gC − cC ). (15)
According to the indifference between Attack and Cooperate under the mixed-strategy σR, we can get
EuS(Attack)= EuS(Cooperate)
δ∗ = (p · gA− p · cA − gC + cC )/(p · (α · gA+ α · gD)). (16)
In summary, when
p ≥ (β · lF + cD)/(α · gD+ α · gA+ β · lF ), (17)
there is a mixed-strategy BNE
{(σ ∗S (aS(θS = 1) = Attack), aS(θS = 0) = Cooperate), σ ∗R (aR(θR) = Defend)}
which means the malicious member sensor node plays Attack with probability ρ∗ and the normal member sensor node
always plays Cooperatewhile the CH-IDS agent R plays Defendwith probability δ∗. 
According to Theorems 1 and 2, in the stage Intrusion Detection Game, the member sensor node S and the CH-IDS agent
R will select their different optimal actions under different probability p which the BNE can be attained. We can find that
p is related to the CH-IDS agent detection rate α and the false alarm rate β . We also can estimate that p will be very slow
in Theorem 1 because the gains of Defend and Attack are very large. As the belief grows, in Theorem 2, the mixed-strategy
BNEwhich is related top, α and β , requires themalicious member sensor node to be less aggressive in attack. The advantage
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of using this stage Intrusion Detection Game above is that the CH-IDS agents are not always on Defend action at each time
slot, as a result, the power consumption of CH can be saved. However, a reasonable prior belief p at each individual time
slot is difficult to determine. That is, this belief should be updated dynamically according to actual situations. Next, we
will develop the static one-stage game to a multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game and discuss how the belief is
updated.
3.4. Multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game
Following the interactions between the member sensor node S and the CH-IDS agent R, the Intrusion Detection Game
will be played repeatedly at each continuous time slot tk, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n(n ∈ Z+). We assume that the utilities of
member sensor node S and CH-IDS agent R at the tkth stage game are the same as those of the tk−1th stage game, i.e., there
is no discount in the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game.
Based on Bayesian rule, the process of belief updating for CH-IDS agent R can be conducted from the tkth stage game to
the tk+1th stage game. We let hS(tk) be the historic actions of member sensor node S, aS(tk) be the member sensor node S ′
action at the tkth stage game, and p(θS = 1|aS(tk), hS(tk)) be the posterior belief that means the probability of the malicious
member sensor nodes at the end of the tkth stage game.
Definition 2. The posterior belief of CH-IDS agent R can be computed by
p(θS = 1 | aS(tk), hS(tk)) = p(θS = 1 | hS(tk)) · p(aS(tk) | θS = 1, hS(tk))∑
θ ′S∈ΘS
p(θ ′S | hS(tk)) · p(aS(tk) | θ ′S, hS(tk))
, (18)
where p(θS |hS(tk)) denotes the prior belief under history actions hS(tk) and p(aS(tk)|θS, hS(tk)) denotes the probability that
member sensor node S sends action aS(tk) under history actions hS(tk) at the tkth stage game.
Since there are detection rates and false alarm rates of the CH-IDS agent, the observed actions by the CH-IDS agent may
not always reflect the actuality accurately. We consider the effect of detection rate and false alarm rate on computing the
conditional probabilities p(aS(tk)|θS, hS(tk)), which can be obtained respectively as follows:
p(Attack|θ S = 1, hS(tk)) = α · ρ + β · (1− ρ), (19)
p(Cooperate|θ S = 1, hS(tk)) = (1− α) · ρ + (1− β) · (1− ρ), (20)
p(Attack|θ S = 0, hS(tk)) = β, (21)
p(Cooperate|θ S = 0, hS(tk)) = 1− β, (22)
where 1− α denotes the false negative rate and 1− β denotes the true negative rate.
Definition 3. The multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game is a 5-tuple (N,Θ, A, P(D),U) where:
• N,Θ , A, and U are defined in Definition 1;
• P(D) = (p(θS = 1|hS(tk)), 1 − p(θS = 1|hS(tk))) where p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) denotes the probability of malicious
member sensor nodes under the condition of historic actions hS(tk) at the tkth stage game, and it will be updated by
p(θS = 1|aS(tk), hS(tk)) computed in Eq. (18) at the end of the tkth stage game.
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) can be applied to characterize the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game.
With the belief updated, themulti-stage dynamic IntrusionDetectionGamewill be played in a sequentialmanner.Moreover,
the member sensor node S and the CH-IDS agent R will not always take the same strategy at each stage for producing
the most utilities. Their best response strategies are dependent on the current beliefs that may change as the multi-stage
dynamic Intrusion Detection Game evolves. Therefore, based on PBE, the complete system of beliefs about the opponents’
type can be achieved and the best response actions of member sensor node S and CH-IDS agent R can be taken. Before we
seek the PBE of our multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game, we firstly show that our game satisfies the Bayesian
conditions.
Definition 4 ([20]). The Bayesian conditions include
B(i): The posterior beliefs are independent, and all types of player i have the same beliefs.
B(ii): Bayesian rule is used to update beliefs.
B(iii): The players do not signal what they do not know.
B(iv): The posterior beliefs are consistent with a common joint distribution onΘ .
Lemma 1. The multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game satisfies the Bayesian conditions.
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Proof. B(i) is satisfied because the CH-IDS agent R has only one type. B(ii) is satisfied because the Eq. (28) is derived from
Bayesian rule. B(iii) is satisfied because the signal of member sensor node S is determined by its action and if aS(tk) = a′S(tk)
then p(θS |aS(tk), hS(tk)) = p(θS |a′S(tk), hS(tk)). B(iv) is satisfied because our game has only two players at any stage and
there are no other players influencing the belief updating of the CH-IDS agent R on the member sensor node S. 
Theorem 3. In the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game, there is a mixed-strategy PBE.
Proof. At the tkth stage game, let σSk = (ρk, 1−ρk)where ρk denotes the probability of the malicious member sensor node
θS = 1 playing Attack, and σRk = (δk, 1− δk)where δk denotes the probability of the CH-IDS agent R playing Defend. For the
CH-IDS agent R, the expected utilities of Defend and Idle at the tkth stage game are
EuR(Defend) = ρk · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (α · gD− (1− α) · gA − cD)+ (1− ρk) · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (−β · lF − cD)
+ (1− p(θS = 1|hS(tk))) · (−β · lF − cD) (23)
and
EuR(Idle) = ρk · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (−gA)+ (1− ρk) · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · 0+ (1− p(θS = 1|hS(tk))) · 0
= −ρk · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · gA. (24)
According to the indifference between Defend and Idle under the mixed-strategy σSk , we can get
EuR(Defend)= EuR(Idle)
ρ∗k = (β · lF + cD)/(p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (α · gD + α · gA+β · lF )). (25)
For the malicious member sensor node θS = 1, the expected utilities of Attack and Cooperate are
EuS(Attack)= δk · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · ((1− α) · gA − α · gD − cA)+ (1− δk) · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (gA − cA) (26)
and
EuS(Cooperate) = δk · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (gC − cC )+ (1− δk) · p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (gC − cC )
+ δk · (1− p(θS = 1|hS(tk))) · (gC − cC )+ (1−δk) · (1− p(θS = 1|hS(tk))) · (gC − cC ). (27)
According to the indifference of Attack and Cooperate under the mixed-strategy σRk , we can get
EuS(Attack)= EuS(Cooperate)
δ∗k = (p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · gA − p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · cA − gC + cC )/(p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) · (α · gA+ α · gD)). (28)
In summary, there is a mixed-strategy PBE that can be attained with strategy profile (σ ∗Sk , σ
∗
Rk
) at the tkth stage game,
where σ ∗Sk and σ
∗
Rk
will be associated with α, β , and the updated p(θs = 1|hs(tk)).
According to Theorem 3, it indicates that the two rational players, member sensor node S and CH-IDS agent R, will play
with the strategy profile (σ ∗Sk , σ
∗
Rk
). They will select their optimal actions respectively as the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion
Detection Game evolves. 
4. Design of CH-IDS agent based on PBE
Based on the PBE of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game, we propose and design a detection mechanism.
The interactions between the member sensor node S and the CH-IDS agent R are illustrated in Fig. 3.
As shown in Fig. 3, there are four entities: Stored data, Administrator, Member sensor node S, and CH-IDS agent
R. The Stored data include gD, gA, cA, cc, cD, lF , α, β , and p(θS = 1|hS(tk)). Member sensor node S may be malicious
or normal, thus, it sends various Attack or Cooperate actions that consist of the Monitored data to the CH-IDS agent R.
Before the CH-IDS agent R starts working, Administrator has configured the CH-IDS agent R for making it more reliable
and accurate. In the CH-IDS agent R, the IDS engine that incorporates the well-known detection technique can decide
whether the Monitored data is malicious or normal. Then the CH-IDS agent R begins to initiate game parameters including
gD, gA, cA, cc, cD, lF , α, β , and p(θs = 1|hs(tk)) from the Stored data. Based on these parameters, the one-stage Intrusion
Detection Game is built up. It receives the output of the IDS engine and formulates the game in which Administrator
has defined the utilities manually and firstly. The process of computing δ∗k is a key that requires the input data from the
game and implements an algorithm to calculate the probability of Defend according to Theorem 3. Thus, the CH-IDS agent R
decides what probabilities of Defend and Idle according to δ∗k . Finally, the CH-IDS agent R computes p(θS = 1|aS(tk), hS(tk)),
update p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) with p(θS = 1|aS(tk), hS(tk)), and store p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) into the Stored data for the next stage
game.
S. Shen et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 62 (2011) 2404–2416 2413
Fig. 3. Detention mechanism of IDS agent based on PBE.
The PBE based intrusion detection algorithm for WSNs is described as follows.
Algorithm 1. PBE based intrusion detection algorithm for CH-IDS agent R
Select Idle;
Do WHILE.T.
Waked by the Monitored data;
Get a record from the Monitored data;
IF the record is Malicious THEN
IF the game is not existed THEN
Build up a game;
ELSE
Get the game from the stored game;
ENDIF
Compute δ∗k ;
Compute p(θS = 1|aS(tk), hS(tk));
Update p(θS = 1|hS(tk))with p(θS = 1|aS(tk), hS(tk));
Store p(θS = 1|hS(tk)) into the Stored data;
Select Defend with probability δ∗k ;
ELSE
Select Idle;
ENDIF
ENDDO
5. Simulations
In our simulations, we employ MATLAB R2009a to depict the properties of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection
Game. At the tkth stage game, we compare the different posterior belief, p(θS = 1|aS(tk), hS(tk)), on the malicious member
sensor node in terms of different α and β . We also investigate the change trend of ρ∗k , the probability of the malicious
member sensor node playing Attack, and δ∗k , the probability of CH-IDS agent R playing Defend according to α, β , and the
updated p(θs = 1|hs(tk)). We suppose our WSNs in general situations where some given game parameters are described as
follows: gA = 250, gC = 5, gD = 200, cA = 20, cC = 5, cD = 10, and lF = 15.
Fig. 4 shows the convergence speed of CH-IDS agent’s posterior belief when different detection rates are given under the
same false alarm rate β = 0.05. We can see that the higher the detection rate is, the quicker the posterior belief converges.
When p(θs = 1|Attack,hs(tk)) converges to 1, it is at the 10th stage game if α = 0.9, at the 12th stage game if α = 0.7, and
at the 16th stage game if α = 0.5.
Unlike Fig. 5 considers different false alarm rate under the same detection rate α = 0.9. It shows that the lower the false
alarm rate is, the faster the posterior belief converges. When p(θs = 1| Attack, hs(tk)) converges to 1, it is at the 5th stage
game if β = 0.01, at the 7th stage game if β = 0.02, and at the 10th stage game if β = 0.05. According to Figs. 4 and 5, it is
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Fig. 4. Posterior belief on malicious member sensor nodes (1).
Fig. 5. Posterior belief on malicious member sensor nodes (2).
quicker to decide whether the member sensor node S is malicious as the detection rate α goes up and the false alarm rate
β goes down. That is, the convergence speed of CH-IDS agent detecting a malicious member sensor node increases with the
detection accuracy.
In Fig. 6, we suppose hS(20) = [00000111110010110000], where 1 represents Attack action, 0 represents Cooperate
action at the corresponding stage game, continuous 1 represents that the malicious sensor node attacks repeatedly, and
continuous 0 represents that the malicious sensor node disguises itself, i.e., theWSNs are normal during those times. Under
history condition hS(20), Fig. 6 shows the results of p(θs = 1| Attack, hs(tk)). We can see in the case of high detection rate
(α = 0.9) and low false alarm rate (β = 0.01) that the posterior belief to decide whether the member sensor node S is
malicious converges to 1 quickly when they play continuous Attack actions in WSNs. Once the posterior belief reaches 1, it
can not automatically decrease to a lower value even if the CH-IDS agent receives Cooperate actions sent by the malicious
member sensor node in the subsequent stage game. This means the CH-IDS agent will take activate Defend action. In the
case of low detection rate (α = 0.5) and high false alarm rate (β = 0.1), however, the convergence speed of the posterior
belief is slower than the former case. This is because the CH-IDS agent is not sensitive in such a circumstance.
In Fig. 7, we suppose the same false alarm rate β = 0.05 and the probabilities of the malicious member sensor node
selectingAttack action and the CH-IDS agent selectingDefend action are 0.5 and 0.9 respectivelywhenα equals 0.6. According
to Eqs. (25) and (28), the PBE strategy profile (σ ∗Sk , σ
∗
Rk
) is associated to the expected utilities of malicious member sensor
node and CH-IDS agent respectively. It also depends on the updated belief of the CH-IDS agent. Fig. 7 shows the gradual
decreasing tendency of probabilities of the malicious member sensor node selecting Attack action and the CH-IDS agent
selecting Defend action as α varies from 0.6 to 1. The higher α is, the lower ρ∗k and δ
∗
k are. That is, the probabilities of the
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Fig. 6. Posterior belief on malicious member sensor nodes under hs(20).
Fig. 7. Probability.
malicious sensor node selecting Attack action and the CH-IDS selecting Defend action decrease as α goes up. Therefore, the
CH-IDS agent should raise its detection rate for decreasing the cost of the CH-IDS agent for defending malicious member
sensor nodes’ Attack action.
From simulation results above, the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game can predict the optimal selections of
the CH-IDS agent. It can update rationally the probability of malicious member sensor nodes in WSNs with respect to the
history actions of them. By improving the detection rate and declining the false alarm rate, the convergence speed of the
CH-IDS agent judging whether the member sensor node is malicious becomesmuch faster. Thus, the CH-IDS agent based on
PBE is able to defend the malicious member sensor nodes’ Attack action quickly and actively.
6. Conclusion
In order to select the optimal intrusion detection strategy to lower resources consumption in WSNs, we have proposed
an Intrusion Detection Game based on the signaling game. This game simulating the interactions between amember sensor
node and a CH-IDS agent indicates the characteristic of different stage of attack and defend. The distributed-centralized
network model, which we adopted, has decreased the power consumption efficiently. The stage Intrusion Detection Game
has revealed the essence of WSNs at every individual slot time. At the same time, its pure-strategy BNE and mixed-strategy
BNE have made the CH-IDS agent choose Idle or Defend action, not always Defend. Thus, power consumption is saved again.
As the game evolves, we have developed the stage game into a multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game in which the
belief can be updated dynamically with respect to the new action and history actions of the malicious member sensor node.
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We have gained the mixed-strategy PBE that can guide the CH-IDS agent employing the best response strategy. Based on
the PBE of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game, the intrusion detection algorithm has been proposed to find
the implementation of the Intrusion Detection Game. Simulation results have shown the effectiveness of the proposed game
that can predict the type of member sensor nodes. Thus, the CH-IDS agent can choose its optimal strategy for defending the
malicious sensor node’s Attack actively.
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